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Abstract:  Using a sample of former colonies, this paper assesses two theories regarding the 
historical determinants of financial development.  The law and finance theory holds that legal 
traditions, brought by colonizers, differ in terms of protecting the rights of private investors vis-à-
vis the state, with important implications for financial development.  The endowment theory argues 
that the disease environment encountered by colonizers influences the formation of long-lasting 
institutions.  The empirical results provide evidence for both theories.  However, initial endowments 
are more robustly associated with financial intermediary development and explain more of the 
cross-country variation in financial intermediary and stock market development. 
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1. Introduction 
A substantial body of work suggests that well-functioning financial intermediaries and 
markets promote economic growth (see, e.g., Levine, 1997).  The view that financial systems exert 
a first-order impact on economic growth raises critical questions: How have some countries 
developed well-functioning financial systems, while others have not?  Why do some countries have 
strong laws and property rights protection that support private contracting and financial systems, 
while others do not?  While considerable research examines the finance-growth relationship, much 
less work examines the fundamental sources of differences among nations in financial development. 
This paper empirically evaluates two theories concerning the historical determinants of 
financial systems.  First, the law and finance theory holds that: (a) legal traditions differ in terms of 
the priority they attach to protecting the rights of private investors vis-à-vis the state; (b) private 
property rights protection forms the basis of financial contracting and overall financial 
development; and, (c) the major legal traditions were formed in Europe centuries ago and were then 
spread through conquest, colonization, and imitation (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1998, henceforth LLSV).  Thus, the law and finance theory predicts that historically 
determined differences in legal traditions help explain international differences in financial systems 
today.  
The law and finance theory focuses on the differences between the two most influential legal 
traditions, the British Common law and the French Civil law (see, e.g., Hayek, 1960; LLSV, 1998).  
According to this theory, the British Common law evolved to protect private property owners 
against the crown (Merryman, 1985).
1  This facilitated the ability of private property owners to 
                                                            
1 While landholding rights in England were originally based on King William I´s feudal system, the courts developed 
legal rules that treated large estate holders as private property owners and not as tenants of the king. Indeed, the 
common law at the dawn of the 17
th century was principally a law of private property (e.g., Littleton, 1481, and Coke,  2  
transact confidently, with positive repercussions on financial development (North and Weingast, 
1989).  In contrast, the French Civil law was constructed to eliminate the role of a corrupt judiciary, 
solidify state power, and restrain the courts from interfering with state policy.
2  Over time, state 
dominance produced a legal tradition that focuses more on the rights of the state and less on the 
rights of individual investors than the British Common law (Hayek, 1960; Mahoney, 2001).   
According to the law and finance theory, a powerful state with a responsive legal system will have 
the incentives and capabilities to divert the flow of society’s resources from optimal toward favored 
ends, and therefore this power will hinder the development of free, competitive financial systems. 
Thus, the law and finance theory predicts that countries that have adopted a French Civil law 
tradition will tend to place less emphasis on private property rights protection and will enjoy 
correspondingly lower levels of financial development than countries with a British Common law 
tradition. 
  The law and finance theory focuses on the origin of a country’s legal tradition.  The French 
imposed the Napoleonic Code in all conquered lands and colonies.  Furthermore, the Code shaped 
the Spanish and Portuguese legal systems, which further spread the French Civil law to Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies. Similarly, the British instituted the Common law in its colonies. According to 
the law and finance theory, the spread of legal traditions had enduring influences on national 
approaches to private property rights and financial development — British colonizers advanced a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1628). During the great conflict between Parliament and the English kings in the 16
th and 17
th centuries, the crown 
attempted to reassert feudal prerogatives and sell monopoly rights to cope with budgetary shortfalls. Parliament 
(composed mostly of landowners and wealthy merchants) along with the courts took the side of the property owners 
against the crown. While King James I argued that royal prerogative superseded the common law, the courts asserted 
that the law is king, Lex, Rex.  The Stuarts were thrown out in 1688. 
2 By the 18
th century, there was a notable deterioration in the integrity and prestige of the judiciary. The crown sold 
judgeships to rich families and the judges unabashedly promoted the interests of the elite. [Refer to Dawson, 1968, p. 
373]. Unsurprisingly, the French Revolution strove to eliminate the role of the judiciary in making and interpreting the 
law.  Robespierre even argued that, “the word jurisprudence ... must be effaced from our language.” [Quoted from 
Dawson, 1968, p. 426] Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) explain antagonism toward jurisprudence and the exaltation of the 
role of the state encouraged the development of easily verifiable “bright-line-rules” that do not rely on the discretion of  3  
legal tradition that stresses private property rights and fosters financial development, whereas in 
contrast colonizers that spread the French Civil law implanted a legal tradition that is less conducive 
to financial development. 
The endowment theory, on the other hand, emphasizes the roles of geography and the 
disease environment in shaping institutional development; we apply this theory to the development 
of private property rights and financial institutions.  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 
henceforth AJR) base their theory on three premises.  First, AJR note that Europeans adopted 
different types of colonization strategies.  At one end of the spectrum, the Europeans settled and 
created institutions to support private property and check the power of the state.  These settler 
colonies include the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
Europeans did not aim to settle but rather to extract as much from the colony as possible.  In these 
“extractive states,” Europeans did not create institutions to support private property rights; instead, 
they established institutions that empowered the elite to extract gold, silver, etc. (e.g., Congo, Ivory 
Coast, and much of Latin America).   
The second component of AJR’s theory holds that the type of colonization strategy was 
heavily influenced by the feasibility of settlement. Mortality rates were startlingly high in some 
places.  In the first year of the Sierra Leone Company, 72 percent of the Europeans died. In the 
1805 Mungo park expedition in Gambia and Niger, all of the Europeans died before completing the 
trip.   In these inhospitable environments, Europeans tended to create extractive states (AJR, 2001).  
In areas where endowments favored settlement, Europeans tended to form settler colonies. For 
instance, AJR note that the Pilgrims decided to settle in the American colonies instead of Guyana 
partially because of the high mortality rates in Guyana.  Moreover, Curtin (1964, 1998) documents 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
judges.  Thus, codification supported the strengthening of the government and relegated judges to a relatively minor, 
bureaucratic role.  4  
that European newspapers published colonial mortality rates widely, so that potential settlers would 
have information about colonial endowments.  Thus, according to the endowment theory, the 
disease environment shaped colonization strategy and the types of institutions established by 
European colonizers. 
The final piece of the AJR theory of institutional development stresses that the institutions 
created by European colonizers endured after independence.  Settler colonies tended to produce 
post-colonial governments that were more democratic and more devoted to defending private 
property rights than extractive colonies.  In contrast, since extractive colonies had institutions for 
effectively extracting resources, the post-colonial elite frequently assumed power and readily 
exploited the pre-existing extractive institutions. Young (1994) presents historical evidence that 
once authoritarian institutions are efficiently extracting resources from the bulk of society, post-
independence rulers tend to use these institutions to their own advantage and profit. This was the 
case in Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Congo.  Latin America was similar.  For instance, while 
Mexicans gained independence from European colonialists, the elite that assumed power took 
advantage of the existing institutions to extract resources rather than create institutions to protect 
private property contracts, and foster broad-based economic development. Furthermore, Engerman, 
Mariscal, and Sokoloff (1998) demonstrate the long-lasting impact of initial institutions on voting 
rights: once regimes restrict voting rights to protect the elite from the masses, the government tends 
to resist changes in suffrage policies for long periods. 
While AJR (2001) focus on institutional development in general, their theory is applicable to 
the financial sector. In an extractive environment, colonizers will not construct institutions that 
favor the development of free, competitive financial markets because competitive markets may 
threaten the position of the extractors. In settler colonies, however, colonizers will be much more 
likely to construct institutions that protect private property rights and hence foster financial  5  
development.  Thus, according to the endowment theory, differences in endowments shaped initial 
institutions and these initial institutions have had long-lasting repercussions on private property 
rights protection and financial development.
 3 
Although the law and endowment theories both stress the importance of initial institutions in 
shaping the financial systems we observe today, they highlight very different shaping mechanisms.  
The law and finance theory focuses on the legal tradition established by the colonizer.  The 
endowment theory focuses on the disease and geography endowments of the colony and how these 
endowments shaped both colonization strategy and the construction of long-lasting institutions.  In 
the law and finance theory, the identity of the colonizer is crucial, but the identity of the colonizer is 
irrelevant according to the endowment theory. Similarly, in the endowment theory, the endowments 
of the lands where Europeans arrived are crucial, but the law and finance theory gives no weight to 
the mortality rates of European colonizers in explaining the development of today’s private property 
rights and financial systems. This is admittedly overstated.  Proponents of the law and finance 
theory do not argue that endowments are irrelevant.  Similarly, proponents of the endowment theory 
do not contend that legal origin is irrelevant.  Rather, each theory articulates very distinct 
mechanisms about how the colonization period shaped national views toward private property rights 
and financial development.  We stress – and empirically evaluate — these distinct predictions. 
While these two explanations of financial development offer very different causal mechanisms, they 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
                                                            
3 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) note another channel through which geographical endowments shape initial institutions 
with enduring effects on economic development. Namely, they show that agriculture in southern North America and 
much of South America is conducive to large plantations. Thus, colonists developed long-lasting institutions to protect 
the few landowners against the many peasants. In contrast, northern North America’s agriculture is conducive to small 
farms, so more egalitarian institutions emerged. Thus, again, endowments influence the formation of institutions 
associated with openness and competition. Our primary reason for focusing on the AJR (2001) measure of settler 
mortality and not also examining agricultural endowments is that AJR (2001) have assembled data for a broad cross-
section of countries.  6  
To evaluate empirically the law and endowment theories of financial development, we use 
cross-country regressions on a sample of 70 former colonies, for reasons described below.  We 
examine whether cross-country differences in financial institutions are accounted for by cross-
country differences in legal tradition and/or initial endowments, while controlling for other possible 
determinants.  To measure financial development, we use measures of: (i) financial intermediary 
development; (ii) equity market development; and, (iii) private property rights protection. For 
simplicity, we use the term “financial development” to refer to each of these three measures. We 
measure financial development over the period 1990 to 1995.  To measure legal tradition, we use 
the LLSV (1999) indicators specifying whether the country has a British or French legal tradition, 
as determined by the origin of each country’s Company/Commercial law.  To measure initial 
endowments, we primarily use the AJR measure of settler mortality rates as European settlers 
arrived in various parts of the globe. For robustness, we also use the absolute value of the latitude of 
each country as an alternative, albeit less precise, indicator of initial endowments, since many 
authors argue that tropical climates are not conducive to institutional and economic development.  
In conducting the cross-country comparisons, we control for other potential determinants of 
financial development.  Specifically, we include measures of ethnic diversity, religious 
composition, years of independence since 1776, and continent dummy variables.  Further, we also 
assess whether the political structure of a country is the only mechanism through which the legal 
tradition and initial endowments influence current financial development. 
We focus on a sample of 70 former colonies for two reasons.  First, we have the AJR (2001) 
data on settler mortality, which is a key building block of AJR’s (2001) empirical assessment of the 
endowment theory.  Second, some observers stress that European colonization offers a unique 
break, i.e., a natural identifying condition (AJR, 2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). As 
European conquerors and colonizers landed, they brought different legal traditions. Colonization  7  
represents a period during which legal traditions were exogenously established around the globe and 
thus provides a natural starting point for examining the law and endowment theories of financial 
development.  For these reasons, we use a sample of 70 former colonies with data on settler 
mortality.  This sample only includes countries with British and French legal origins. 
This paper makes four contributions.
4  First, this paper applies AJR’s (2001) endowment 
theory of institutions directly to the study of financial development.  Although AJR (2001) carefully 
document the connections running from endowments to institutions to the level of economic 
development today, we examine whether initial colonial endowments explain a wide array of 
current measures of financial development. Since financial development helps explain technological 
innovation, the efficiency of capital allocation across industries and firms, output volatility, the 
likelihood of a systemic banking crisis, and economic growth, even when controlling for the levels 
of economic and institutional development, it is important to assess whether endowments influence 
financial development.
5  Second, this is the first paper to consider simultaneously the legal and 
endowment views of financial development.  This is crucial to assessing two very different visions 
of how the institutions founded by Europeans continue to shape national approaches to private 
property and financial systems in former colonies.  Third, although others have shown that legal 
tradition shapes financial development (LLSV, 1997; 1998; 2000), this paper goes much further in 
evaluating the robustness of the law and finance view by controlling for endowments, religion, 
ethnic diversity, length of independence, etc.  This assessment is critical if we are to have much 
                                                            
4 Alexander Pivovarsky (2001) also examines the relationship between institutions and financial development.  He 
analyzes the impact of current institutions, instrumented by settler mortality and legal origin, on financial development 
and finds a stronger effect of the exogenous component of institutions on financial development.  Our contribution is 
distinct, however, in that we compare endowments and legal origin for their direct effects on financial system 
development.  
5 In particular, see Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) on the finance and productivity growth relationship, Wurgler 
(2000) on the finance and industry allocation of capital relationship, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) on the 
finance and firm growth link, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) on the finance and crisis relationship, Easterly, 
Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) on the finance and output volatility links, and Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), and Beck and Levine (2002, 2003) on the finance-growth relationship.  8  
confidence in legal theories of financial development.  Fourth, while some analysts argue that the 
structure and competitiveness of the political system shapes institutions and policies, this is the first 
paper to examine whether legal origin and both disease and geographical endowments explain 
cross-country differences in financial development beyond their ability to account for differences in 
national political systems. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents figures that 
motivate the analysis.  Section 3 discusses the regression results, and a series of robustness tests are 
presented in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.  
  9  
2. Data and initial assessments 
  This section describes the data and presents figures that document: (1) British Common law 
countries tend to have higher levels of financial development than French Civil law countries; and, 
(2) countries with high levels of European mortality during the initial stages of colonization tend to 
have lower levels of financial development than those countries with initially low settler-mortality 
rates. 
2.1. Financial development 
To measure financial development, we use indicators of financial intermediary development, 
stock market development, and property rights protection.  The goal is to proxy for the degree to 
which national financial systems facilitate the acquisition of firm information, ease corporate 
governance, help agents manage risk, and mobilize savings effectively. Unfortunately, we do not 
have direct and comparable measures of the ability of national financial systems to provide these 
benefits for a broad cross-section of countries.  Thus, we use a variety of indicators of financial 
development to assess the connections between law, endowments, and finance. 
PRIVATE CREDIT equals financial intermediary credits to the private sector divided by 
gross domestic product (GDP) and is measured over 1990 to 1995. PRIVATE CREDIT excludes 
credit to the public sector and cross-claims between financial intermediaries, and thus measures the 
amount of savings that is channeled through debt-issuing financial intermediaries to private 
borrowers. For most countries, PRIVATE CREDIT is obtained from data available from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  To maximize the size of the sample, however, we also use 
World Bank data sources for a few countries that lack IMF data; the countries and sources are 
specified in the data appendix. Past work shows a strong connection between PRIVATE CREDIT  10 
and economic growth (see Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000).  PRIVATE CREDIT ranges from 
values above 0.9 in the United States, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa, and Malaysia, to values 
less than 0.03 in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Angola, and Zaire. 
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT equals the total value of outstanding equity shares as 
a fraction of GDP and is averaged over the period 1990 to 1995.
6 This measures the overall size of 
the equity market relative to the size of the economy.
7 The data are primarily collected from the 
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation.  However, we use additional data sources to 
complete the dataset, as specified in the appendix. There are large cross-country differences as 
shown in Table 1, Panel A.  STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT is greater than 0.65 in the United 
States, Chile, Singapore, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Malaysia, and is indistinguishable from 
zero in 29 countries. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS is an index of the degree to which the government enforces laws that 
protect private property. The data are for 1997 and were obtained from LLSV (1999) and the Index 
of Economic Freedom. While PRIVATE CREDIT and STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT are 
direct measures of the size of financial intermediaries and equity markets respectively, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS does not directly measure the size of a component of the financial sector.  Rather, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS measures a key input into the efficient operation of financial contracts and 
the development of formal financial institutions: the degree of protection of private property rights.  
The law and endowment theories stress the degree to which national institutions emphasize private 
property rights versus the rights of the state.  This difference in emphasis may influence a variety of 
                                                            
6 For both STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT and PRIVATE CREDIT, we have conducted the analyses using data 
averaged over the 1975 to 1995 period instead of the 1990 to 1995 period. We get the same results. Since there are 
fewer countries with data over the 1975 to 1995 period, we present the results with the 1990 to 1995 averages. 
7 Since there are differences in ownership concentration across countries, LLSV (1998) suggest using an adjustment 
whereby STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT is multiplied by one minus the median ownership share of the three 
largest shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in the country.  This paper obtains 
the same conclusions using this adjusted measure.  Since we only have these ownership share figures for a sub-sample  11 
indicators of financial development.  While PROPERTY RIGHTS as defined is one attempt to 
measure this difference, there may be measurement problems or other differences in emphasis on 
state versus private rights that affect financial contracting beyond narrow indicators of property 
rights protection.  Hence, we examine a variety of financial development indicators.  The maximum 
value of PROPERTY RIGHTS is five, while a value of one indicates the weakest property rights 
protection. Nine former colonies have the maximum value of five. Only Haiti and Rwanda have the 
minimum value of one, while 15 countries have a value of two for PROPERTY RIGHTS. We do 
not have data on PROPERTY RIGHTS for the Central African Republic, so there are only 69 
countries in the PROPERTY RIGHTS regressions. 
2.2. Legal origin 
LLSV (1998, 1999) identify the legal origin of each country’s company or commercial law 
as French, British, German, Scandinavian, or Socialist.
8  Given we are examining former colonies 
with data on settler mortality from AJR (2001), we have data for only French and British legal-
origin countries.
9 Thus, we do not include many of the most developed countries in the LLSV 
(1998, 1999) sample.  The FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN dummy variable equals one if the country 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of countries, however, making this adjustment substantially reduces our dataset.  Thus, we report the results using the 
standard STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT indicator for market size. 
8 One may further refine the categorization of legal traditions, as described by the following examples.  First, Franks 
and Sussman (1999) and Coffee (2000) describe differences in the adaptability of two Common law countries: the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  While in the U.K. there is freedom of contracting and the judiciary is therefore 
not very powerful, in the U.S. the judiciary has a more important role to play in developing law.  In both systems, 
however, the legislature does not have a monopoly on creating law, as in the original French legal system, as designed 
by Napoleon. In both the U.K. and the U.S., case law is a source of law, while not in France. Second, different 
colonization strategies may have intensified differences across legal traditions.  England did not try to replace Islamic, 
Hindu, or African law.  English courts in the colonies, therefore, used local laws and customs in deciding cases.  This 
quickly produced an Indian Common law distinct from English Common law.  While perhaps chaotic, this allowed for 
the integration of common law with local circumstances.  In contrast, the French imposed the Code although serious 
conflicts frequently existed with local customs.  Also, legal scholars study differences across the French Civil law 
countries of Latin America.  While recognizing that each country’s legal system is special, the comparative law 
literature clearly emphasizes that there are key differences across the major legal families. 
9 Although we have data on settler mortality for Vietnam and Myanmar (which are classified as socialist legal origin 
countries by LLSV, 1999), we do not include these two countries because we do not have comparable information on 
financial development for these economies. Also, there are 70 countries in our sample of former colonies with settler 
mortality data. We also constructed a larger sample of 95 non-European countries. This 95-country sample, however,  12 
adopted its company/commercial law from the French Civil law and zero otherwise. In the 
regressions, British legal origin is captured in the constant. 
Fig. 1 clearly shows that financial development is substantially higher in countries with a 
British Common law tradition than in countries with a French Civil law tradition. French Civil law 
countries have, on average, lower levels of PRIVATE CREDIT, STOCK MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT, and PROPERTY RIGHTS than British Common law countries.  There are 45 
French Civil law countries and 25 British Common law countries. The Table 1, Panel B correlations 
confirm Fig. 1: the FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN dummy variable is significantly, negatively 
correlated with each of the three financial development indicators. Furthermore, Fig. 2 illustrates 
that in Common law countries, eight countries have PRIVATE CREDIT greater than 0.6 (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Hong Kong, and the United States), 
while among French Civil law countries, only Malta has PRIVATE CREDIT greater than 0.6. 
Fig. 2 also demonstrates clearly that legal origin does not completely explain the cross-
country variation observed in financial systems today. Fig. 2 documents that there are many 
Common law countries with poorly developed financial intermediaries, and a few French legal 
origin countries that have well-developed financial intermediaries.  For instance, many Common 
law countries have PRIVATE CREDIT less than 0.3, with countries such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
Ghana, Sudan, and Tanzania registering extremely low PRIVATE CREDIT levels. Thus, we need 
to know more than legal origin to account for cross-country differences in financial systems. 
2.3. Endowments 
As Europeans arrived around the world, they encountered very different environments. In 
some lands, Europeans found hospitable environments. In others, conditions were less hospitable 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
does not have settler mortality data. For the 95-country sample, we conducted the analyses using latitude instead of  13 
and Europeans died in large numbers. According to AJR (2001), these location specific 
endowments fundamentally influenced the types of long-lasting institutions created by European 
colonists. 
To measure endowments, we use the AJR (2001) measure of SETTLER MORTALITY. 
AJR (2001) compile data on the death rates faced by settlers. Curtin (1989) constructs data on the 
mortality and disease rates of European soldiers in colonies during the early nineteenth century.
 The 
raw data come from the British, French, and United States governments during the period 1817 to 
1848.  The standard measure is annualized deaths per thousand soldiers, with each death replaced 
by a new soldier. Curtin (1998) adds similar data on soldier mortality during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Finally, Gutierrez (1986) uses Vatican records to construct estimates of the 
mortality rates of bishops in Latin America from 1604 to 1876. Since some of these data overlap 
with Curtin’s separate estimates, AJR confirm the compatibility of the two data series before 
constructing an overall measure of the logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand Europeans, 
SETTLER MORTALITY, for a large group of former colonies.  As in AJR (2001), we use the 
logarithm to diminish the impact of outliers.  The AJR (2001) measure forms the core of our 
analysis of the relation between endowments and finance.  This measure ranges from to 2.15 
(Australia and New Zealand) to 7.99 (Mali). 
Fig. 3 shows a generally negative, though certainly not linear, relation between SETTLER 
MORTALITY and financial development.
10 The absence of a linear relationship is especially 
pronounced for STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT since many countries have stock market 
capitalization ratios of zero.  Consequently, we use a Tobit estimator to check our results. Table 1, 
Panel B shows that there is a significant, negative correlation between SETTLER MORTALITY 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
settler mortality and obtained the same results reported below.  14 
and each of the three financial development indicators at the one-percent significance level. The 
data indicate that in colonies where early settlers found very inhospitable environments, we do not 
observe well-developed financial systems today. 
2.4. Other possible determinants of financial development 
To assess the robustness of our results, we include several other potential determinants of 
financial development in our empirical analysis.  ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION measures the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from different ethnolinguistic 
groups. LSSV (1999, p. 231) argue, “…political theories predict that, as ethnic heterogeneity 
increases, governments become more interventionist.” Recent studies show that in highly ethnically 
diverse economies, the group that comes to power tends to implement policies that: (a) expropriate 
as many resources as possible from the ethnic losers; (b) restrict the rights of other groups; and, (c) 
prohibit the growth of industries or sectors that threaten the ruling group (see, e.g., Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997). When this view is applied to the financial sector, 
the implication is clear: greater ethnic diversity implies the adoption of policies and institutions that 
are focused on maintaining power and control, rather than on creating an open and competitive 
financial system. Table 1, Panel B indicates that there is a significant, negative correlation between 
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION and PRIVATE CREDIT. Thus we include ETHNIC 
FRACTIONALIZATION to examine the independent impacts of law and endowments on financial 
development. 
INDEPENDENCE equals the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been 
independent. We include this measure because a longer period of independence may provide greater 
opportunities for countries to develop institutions, policies, and regulations independent of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 When we experimented with a non-linear transformation (e.g., the inverse of the log settler mortality rate), we obtain 
the same conclusions discussed below.  Furthermore, we re-ran the analyses using the logarithm of PRIVATE CREDIT.  
Again, we confirm the conclusions discussed below.  15 
colonial heritage. In the simple correlations, however, we do not find a significant link between 
INDEPENDENCE and financial development. 
We also examine religious composition.  Many scholars argue that religion shapes national 
views regarding property rights, competition, and the role of the state (LLSV 1999; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2002). Putnam (1993, p. 107), for instance, contends that the Catholic Church fosters 
“vertical bonds of authority” rather than “horizontal bonds of fellowship.”  Similarly, Landes (1998) 
argues that Catholic and Muslim countries tend to develop xenophobic cultures and powerful bonds 
between church and state to maintain control, bonds which limit competition and private property 
rights protection.  
CATHOLIC, MUSLIM, and OTHER RELIGION equal the fraction of the population that is 
Catholic, Muslim, or of another (non-Protestant) religion. The Protestant share of the population is 
omitted (and therefore captured in the regression constant). The data are from LLSV (1999).  
Table 1, Panel B shows that countries with a higher population proportion that is neither 
Catholic, nor Muslim, nor Protestant, have higher levels of financial development than countries 
where a higher fraction of the country is either Catholic or Muslim.  Thus, we control for religious 
composition in examining the independent relations between financial development and both legal 
origin and endowments.  
We note there is a very large, positive, and significant correlation between CATHOLIC and 
FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN (0.48).  Thus, it may be particularly difficult to distinguish fully 
between CATHOLIC and the Civil law tradition.  
Finally, we include one dummy variable for countries in LATIN AMERICA and another for 
countries in Sub-Saharan AFRICA. A large number of studies find that countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America perform more poorly than countries in other regions of the world even  16 
after controlling for economic policies, institutional development, and other factors. Easterly and 
Levine (1997) provide related analyses and citations.   
There are important problems with including continent dummies. First, continent dummies 
do not proxy for a clear explanation of why countries in these regions have worse institutions or 
perform more poorly. Second, Latin America is primarily a French legal-origin continent; the 
correlation between Catholic and Latin America is 0.71 and is significant at the one-percent level. 
Thus, including continent dummies may weaken our ability to identify linkages between financial 
development and legal origin without offering a clear, alternative explanation. Third, many Sub-
Saharan African countries have high settler mortality rates. The correlation between AFRICA and 
SETTLER MORTALITY is 0.65 and is significant at the one-percent level. Thus, including the 
AFRICA dummy may decrease the ability to find a link between financial development and 
endowments without offering an alternative theory.  Including these continent dummies, however, 
may control for region-specific characteristics that are not captured by any of the other explanatory 
variables.  Therefore, while recognizing the problems associated with interpreting continent 
dummies, we include them in assessing the relations between law, endowments, and finance.
11  
3. Regression results 
  This section presents regressions on the relationship between financial development and 
both law and endowments while controlling for other possible determinants of financial 
development. The dependent variable is one of the three measures of financial development, 
PRIVATE CREDIT, STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT, or PROPERTY RIGHTS.  We use the 
dummy variable FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN to assess the links between law and finance. We use 
                                                            
11 In a previous version, we also included GDP per capita as a control variable.  However, institutional development 
also influences economic development (as shown by AJR 2001), so including GDP per capita together with initial  17 
SETTLER MORTALITY to assess the relationship between endowments and finance. As control 
variables, we use continent dummy variables (for Latin American and Africa), measures of religious 
composition, the percentage of years the country has been independent since 1776, and ethnic 
diversity. We also include a regression where we control concurrently for continent dummies, time 
since independence, and ethnic fractionalization.  We do not include religious composition 
dummies in this regression since they never enter significantly at the five-percent significance level.  
The reasons for including these particular controls were discussed above.  
3.1. Law and finance 
  Table 2 presents regressions of financial development on French legal origin and various 
combinations of the control variables.  Table 2 does not include measures of endowments.  
  The results indicate a strong, negative relation between French legal origin and financial 
development.  When controlling for continent, religious composition, ethnic diversity, and 
independence, French legal origin enters negatively and significantly at the five-percent level in all 
of the financial development regressions.  The results suggest an economically large impact. For 
instance, the smallest coefficient (in absolute value) on FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN in the STOCK 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT regressions is -0.27, and the mean and standard deviation values of 
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT are 0.19 and 0.40, respectively. For illustrative purposes, the 
coefficient suggests that if Argentina had a British Common law tradition, its low level of stock 
market capitalization (0.10) would be substantially larger and closer to that of New Zealand (0.37). 
In sum, French Civil law countries tend to have lower levels of financial development than 
British Common law countries after controlling for many national characteristics. This result is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
endowments may bias the coefficient on legal origin and settler mortality/latitude toward zero.  Further, unlike the other 
regressors, GDP per capita is endogenous, which causes estimation problems as shown by AJR (2001).  18 
consistent with the LLSV (1998) view that the identity of the colonizer matters because of the legal 
traditions the colonizers brought. 
3.2. Endowments and finance  
Table 3 indicates a robust, negative association between SETTLER MORTALITY and 
financial development. SETTLER MORTALITY enters with a negative coefficient and is 
significant at the five percent level in all of the PRIVATE CREDIT and STOCK MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT regressions. The coefficient sizes are economically large. According to the 
smallest coefficient (in the absolute sense) in the PRIVATE CREDIT regression in Table 3 (-0.14), 
a one standard deviation reduction in the logarithm of mortality rates (1.24) would increase 
PRIVATE CREDIT by 0.17, and the mean and standard deviation of PRIVATE CREDIT are 0.32 
and 0.30, respectively. Thus, the estimates in Table 3 can account for why countries such as 
Nicaragua and Jamaica with bad endowments (log settler mortality rates of 5.1 and 4.9, 
respectively) have lower levels of financial intermediary development (0.25 and 0.27, respectively) 
than Chile (0.54), which had a log settler mortality rate of 4.2. Furthermore, SETTLER 
MORTALITY enters all of the PROPERTY RIGHTS regressions negatively and significantly, 
except those including continent dummies. As noted, there is an extremely high correlation between 
AFRICA and SETTLER MORTALITY.  Also, as we report below, when we use an alternative 
measure of property rights protection, settler mortality continues to enter significantly even when 
controlling for AFRICA. 
These results support the view that high settler mortality rates are negatively associated with  
the level of financial development today, and are robust to an assortment of control variables. Such 
findings are fully consistent with the AJR (2001, 2002) assertion that a colony’s environmental 
endowments influenced how it was colonized — whether it was an extractive colony or a settler 
colony—with long-lasting implications for institutional development.  19 
3.3. Law, endowments, and finance 
  Table 4 presents regression results on the relation between financial development and both 
law and endowments while controlling for other exogenous determinants of financial development.
  The Table 4 regressions provide strong support for the endowment view of financial 
development. SETTLER MORTALITY enters all of the PRIVATE CREDIT and STOCK 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT regressions significantly at the five-percent level even when 
controlling for legal origin, continent, religious composition, the length of time the country has been 
independent, and ethnic diversity. The sizes of the coefficients on SETTLER MORTALITY in the 
PRIVATE CREDIT and STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT regressions are very similar to those 
in Table 3, in which the regressions do not also control for legal origin. Also similar to Table 3, the 
Table 4 regressions indicate that SETTLER MORTALITY exerts a statistically significant impact 
on PROPERTY RIGHTS except when controlling for the AFRICA dummy variable (because of the 
very high correlation between the rate of settler mortality and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa).  As 
discussed below, however, when we use an alternative measure of property rights protection, settler 
mortality enters significantly even when controlling for the AFRICA dummy variable. 
In sum, poor endowments – as measured by settler mortality – are negatively associated with 
financial development today.  Even when controlling for the legal tradition of the colonizers and 
other possible determinants of financial development, initial endowments of the colonies help 
explain cross-country variation in financial development today, which is strongly supportive of the 
AJR (2001, 2002) endowment view. 
  The Table 4 regressions also provide support for the law and finance view, though some 
qualifications are necessary. When controlling for SETTLER MORTALITY, the relationship 
between financial intermediary development (PRIVATE CREDIT) and legal origin is not robust to 
the inclusion of various control variables.  However, FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN is negatively and  20 
significantly associated with PROPERTY RIGHTS in all of the regressions when controlling for 
SETTLER MORTALITY.  Putting aside regressions that include CATHOLIC (which is extremely 
positively correlated with French Civil law), FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN is also negatively and 
significantly linked with STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT.  To the extent that equity markets 
rely more than banking institutions on well-functioning legal systems to defend the rights of 
individual investors, these findings are consistent with the thrust of the law and finance view. 
Subject to the qualifications discussed above, we interpret the results as generally consistent 
with the LLSV (1998) theory that the French Civil law tends to place greater emphasis on the rights 
of the state versus the rights of individuals, with negative repercussions on financial contracting.  In 
contrast, the British Common law tends to place greater emphasis on the contractual rights of 
individual investors, with positive implications for financial development. While LLSV (1998) 
document the link between financial development and legal origin, this paper goes much further in 
controlling for alternative explanations. Our results demonstrate a strong connection between legal 
origin and both stock market development and private property rights protection, but we also show 
that the link between legal origin and financial intermediary development is not robust to the 
inclusion of numerous control variables.   
In comparing the independent explanatory power between law and endowments, Tables 2-4 
indicate that endowments explain a greater amount of the cross-country variation in financial 
intermediary and stock market development than legal origin.  Consider, for instance, the 
regressions in Tables 2-4 that do not include any regressors beyond FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN and 
SETTLER MORTALITY.  The adjusted R-square in the PRIVATE CREDIT-FRENCH LEGAL 
ORIGIN regression is 0.12 (Table 2), while it is 0.44 in the PRIVATE CREDIT-SETTLER 
MORTALITY regression (Table 3).  Furthermore, when adding FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN to the 
SETTLER MORTALITY regression, the adjusted R-square only rises from 0.44 to 0.48 (Table 4).   21 
As also indicated above, legal origin does not enter the PRIVATE CREDIT regression robustly 
when including various control variables, but endowments remain negatively and significantly 
linked with financial intermediary development across various control variables. Turning to private 
property rights protection, the explanatory power of law and endowments in the PROPERTY 
RIGHTS regressions is very similar.  However, the STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
regressions again illustrate the greater explanatory power of endowments. The adjusted R-square in 
the STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT-FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN regression is 0.17 (Table 2), 
and is 0.27 in the SETTLER MORTALITY regression (Table 3).  Furthermore, when adding 
FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN to the SETTLER MORTALITY regression, the adjusted R-square only 
rises from 0.27 to 0.36 (Table 4).  Thus, while legal origin significantly enters all of the stock 
market development regressions that do not control for religious composition (Table 4), 
endowments explain a greater proportion of the cross-country variation in stock market 
development than legal origin. It is difficult to compare the sizes of the coefficients on SETTLER 
MORTALITY and FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN because a change in legal origin is obviously large 
and discrete.  Nevertheless, we compare a change in legal origin with a change in SETTLER 
MORTALITY from the second quintile to the fourth quintile (i.e., a change of 2.1), which is less 
than a two standard deviation change in SETTLER MORTALITY (2.5).  Using, for instance, the 
coefficients in the last row of the stock market development indicators in Table 4, this implies a 
change in STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT of 0.23 from a legal origin change and 0.34 from 
the endowment change.  The effect of the endowment change is approximately 50% larger. 
Turning to the control variables, the regression analyses do not indicate a robust, consistent 
relationship between the continent dummy variables, the religious composition measures, the length 
of national independence, nor the level of ethnic diversity, on the one hand, and financial 
development, on the other hand, when controlling for legal origin and national endowments. The  22 
Table 4 regressions – as well those in Tables 2 and 3 – do not demonstrate a significant, robust 
relation between any of these control variables and any of the measures of financial development 
when controlling for legal origin and endowments. As emphasized above, French Civil law 
countries also tend to be predominantly Catholic, much of Latin America adopted the French Civil 
law tradition, and Sub-Saharan Africa had very high rates of settler mortality. Nevertheless, while a 
consistent pattern of results emerges for law and endowments, we do not observe a robust set of 
results on the continent dummies, religious composition variables, independence indicator, or ethnic 
diversity measure. 
4. Robustness test 
4.1. Political structure 
As a robustness check, we control for political structure. North (1990) argues that once 
groups gain power, they shape policies and institutions to their own advantages. The work of Finer 
(1997) and Damaska (1986) further suggests that centralized or otherwise powerful states will be 
more responsive to and efficient at implementing the interests of the elite than a decentralized or 
more competitive political system endowed with checks and balances. LLSV (1998) do not control 
for political structure in their examination of the law and finance view.  In a different approach, 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that financial systems do not develop monotonically over time.  
This observation is not fully consistent with the law and endowment theories, which are based on 
time invariant factors.  Rajan and Zingales (2003) instead propose a theory of financial development 
based on controlling interest groups.  In our sensitivity analyses, we focus on the political structure 
view because we encounter data limitations concerning interest groups for our broad cross-section 
of countries.  23 
To assess whether law and endowments continue to explain cross-country differences in 
financial development after controlling for the structure of the political environment, we use two 
measures of political openness. LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION is an index of the degree of 
competitiveness of the last legislative election, ranging from 1 (non-competitive) to 7 (most 
competitive). CHECKS measures the number of influential veto players in legislative and executive 
initiatives. These data are from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, (2001). The politics and 
finance view predicts that greater competition and more checks and balances will limit the ability of 
the elite to dictate policy and institutional development.  
To control for the endogenous determination of political structures, we use instrumental 
variables.
12 As instruments, we include the religious composition variables, independence, and 
ethnic diversity. We include the religious variables since Landes (1998) and others argue that the 
Catholic and Muslim religions tend to produce hierarchical political systems.  We include 
independence since more years of independence may permit greater latitude to shape domestic 
political institutions.  We include ethnic diversity since some theories suggest that ethnic diversity 
will tend to create political systems that stymie competition and permit greater discretion on the part 
of the controlling party (see, e.g., Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999).  The instrumental variables 
significantly explain cross-country variation in the political structure indexes at the one-percent 
significance level. Nevertheless, given the valid skepticism associated with obtaining fully 
acceptable instrumental variables for political structure, we note that: (i) we present these 
exploratory results as a robustness check on the endowment and law theories and not as a strong test 
of the political channel; and, (ii) we are particularly circumspect in interpreting these instrumental 
variable regressions. 
                                                            
12 We find the same results hold when using ordinary least squares and not instrumenting for political structure.  24 
The Table 5 instrumental variable results are consistent with the law and endowment 
theories while controlling for the structure of the political system, and suggest that the politics 
mechanism is not the only channel through which legal origin and endowments influence financial 
development.  As shown, legal origin and endowments continue to enter the financial development 
regressions significantly even when controlling for the exogenous component of political structure 
except for SETTLER MORTALITY in the PROPERTY RIGHTS regressions.  The political 
structure variables do not enter any of the financial development regressions significantly.  Thus, 
there is no evidence in Table 5 that political structure explains cross-country variation in financial 
development beyond the explanatory power of legal origin and environmental endowments.   
Furthermore, the results do not suggest that political structure is the only channel through which 
legal origin and initial endowments influence financial development.  If political structure were the 
only channel through which law and initial endowments influence financial development, we would 
have found significant coefficients on the political structure indicators and insignificant coefficients 
on the legal origin and endowment indicators.  We find the opposite.  Moreover, we run two-stage 
least squares regressions with financial development as the dependent variable and political 
structure as the only explanatory variable in the second stage.  The instruments are legal origin and 
settler mortality.  While political structure enters the financial development regression significantly 
and with the predicted sign, the instruments do not pass the test of over-identifying restrictions.  
These results do not reject the importance of political factors in shaping finance. Rather, the 
evidence in this paper suggests that legal origin and endowments influence financial development 
beyond the structure of the political system.
13 
                                                            
13 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) examine the different channels through which legal origin affects financial 
development.  25 
4.2. Alternative Samples 
  To assess the robustness of the results, we examine different subsamples of countries.  In 
these robustness checks, we only include two regressions to keep the table to a manageable length. 
We include one regression with only the legal origin and endowment variables as regressors and a 
second regression that also includes continent dummy variables, years of independence, and ethnic 
diversity.  We do not include the religious indicators because they do not enter any of the Table 2-4 
regressions significantly at the five percent level. 
  Table 6 presents regression results on five different sub-samples of countries.  Panel A 
excludes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States from the regression.  After 
omitting these countries, the data continue to support both the law and endowment views of 
financial development. The results are fully consistent with the full-sample results in Table 4. 
FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN enters all of the STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT and 
PROPERTY RIGHTS regressions significantly, but does not enter the PRIVATE CREDIT 
regression significantly when controlling for other determinants.  SETTLER MORTALITY enters 
all of the PRIVATE CREDIT and STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT regressions significantly, 
but does not enter significantly in the PROPERTY RIGHTS regression when controlling for 
AFRICA. In Panels B and C, we examine French legal origin and British legal origin countries 
separately to test whether settler mortality accounts for cross-country variation in financial 
development within each group.  Again, the results support the view that the disease environment 
encountered by European settlers shaped the formation of long-lasting financial institutions.  The 
results do suggest, however, that the SETTLER MORTALITY-finance relationship is stronger for 
the British legal origin sample of countries than for the French legal origin sample.  SETTLER 
MORTALITY enters negatively and significantly in all the regressions in Panel C (British-only 
legal origin countries), except for the PROPERTY RIGHTS regression in which we include the  26 
African dummy variable (which we discuss above). SETTLER MORTALITY is not as robustly 
related to equity market development and property rights in the French legal origin subsample – it 
does not enter significantly once we control for AFRICA.  Further, SETTLER MORTALITY 
explains less than half of the cross-country variation in financial development among French Civil 
law countries than among British Common law countries, as can be seen from comparing the 
adjusted R
2 statistics in Panels B and C.  Finally, we also examine high and low settler mortality 
countries.  Here, we assess whether legal origin explains financial development within the high 
(above the median) settler mortality countries and within the low (below the median) settler 
mortality countries. Note there are more countries in Panel E than Panel D because Algeria and 
Morocco have exactly the median level of SETTLER MORTALITY and are allocated to the below-
median group.  When we allocate them to the above-median group, or split them between the two 
groups, we obtain the same results.  The results are broadly consistent with earlier findings. 
FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN is not strongly associated with financial intermediary development 
(PRIVATE CREDIT) in the high-mortality countries.  Nevertheless, legal origin is strongly and 
negatively associated with STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT and PROPERTY RIGHTS in both 
subsamples and PRIVATE CREDIT in the low-mortality sample.  While one notes some 
differences when looking across different subsamples, the same basic pattern emerges as in the full 
sample: law and endowments explain financial development, though the endowment-intermediary 
(PRIVATE CREDIT) relationship is more robust than the law-intermediary (PRIVATE CREDIT) 
relationship. 
4.3. Alternative indicators of financial development 
  Next, we examine alternative measures of financial development.  Specifically, instead of 
examining financial intermediary credit to the private sector (PRIVATE CREDIT), we use the  27 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of financial intermediaries (LIQUID LIABILITIES).  Also, 
instead of using market capitalization to measure stock market development, we examine the total 
value of stock transactions in the economy as a share of GDP (TOTAL VALUE TRADED).   
Finally, instead of utilizing the private property rights protection index as used by LLSV (1999), we 
examine: (a) the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of the degree to which a 
country adheres to the rule of law (RULE OF LAW); and, (b) the Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999) AGGREGATE RULE OF LAW index.  However, the RULE OF LAW and AGGREGATE 
RULE OF LAW indicators are available for fewer countries, 63 and 68, respectively, than the 
PROPERTY RIGHTS measure used throughout the paper thus far. 
  Table 7 indicates that these alternative indicators produce results that are consistent with 
those discussed above.  Settler mortality is significantly, negatively associated with the new 
measures of financial intermediary development, stock market development, and property rights 
protection.  Although the RULE OF LAW-SETTLER MORTALITY relationship weakens when 
including continent dummy variables, years of independence, and ethnic diversity, the 
AGGREGATE RULE OF LAW-SETTLER MORTALITY relationship remains significant when 
controlling for these country traits. Since SETTLER MORTALITY loses its significant relationship 
with two of our three measures of private property rights protection, only when including a dummy 
variable for AFRICA (where settler mortality rates were very high), we interpret these findings as 
broadly consistent with the view that the initial endowments in the various colonies helped shape 
institutional approaches to the protection of private property rights. 
FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN is negatively associated with all the alternative financial 
development indicators except financial intermediary development. As noted above, the relationship 
between law and financial intermediary development is more fragile than the endowment-
intermediary relationship. Unlike in the PROPERTY RIGHTS regressions of Tables 2-4, SETTLER  28 
MORTALITY explains a larger share of the variation in the RULE OF LAW and AGGREGATE 
RULE OF LAW regressions than FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN.  As discussed in Section 3.3, we 
draw this conclusion by comparing adjusted-R
2 statistics across regressions with only legal origin, 
with only SETTLER MORTALITY, and then with SETTLER MORTALITY and legal origin 
dummies included simultaneously. The regressions with only SETTLER MORTALITY and only 
the legal origin dummy variable for this sample of countries are not reported. 
4.4. Alternative endowment indicator 
  Next, we use an alternative measure of endowments, LATITUDE, which equals the absolute 
value of the latitude of each country normalized to lie between zero and one. We take the data from 
LLSV (1999). Countries that are closer to the equator will tend to have a more tropical climate 
inhospitable to European settlers and therefore will more likely foster extractive institutions.
14 
However, LATITUDE is not as precise an indicator of the conditions facing European settlers as 
SETTLER MORTALITY and thus LATITUDE is not as precise an empirical proxy for the AJR 
(2001) endowment theory as SETTLER MORTALITY.  LATITUDE directly measures geographic 
location, not climatic conditions. Accordingly, we have focused our analyses on SETTLER 
MORTALITY, and only include LATITUDE in our robustness checks. 
  The Table 8 regressions with LATITUDE indicate, albeit less robustly than those with 
SETTLER MORTALITY, that countries closer to the equator have lower levels of financial 
development than countries in more temperate climates. LATITUDE is positively associated with 
PROPERTY RIGHTS after using the array of control variables discussed above.  LATITUDE is 
also significantly and positively linked with PRIVATE CREDIT in all of the regressions that do not 
                                                            
14 While some authors stress the direct impact of tropical environments on production (Kamarck, 1976; Crosby, 1989; 
and Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1998), AJR (2002) show that the environment tends to influence economic 
development primarily through its impact on institutions.  [See Easterly and Levine (2003) for evidence consistent with 
AJR (2002)].  29 
include AFRICA, which is very highly correlated with LATITUDE. There is not a strong link 
between LATITUDE and stock market development. Using LATITUDE, we do find a strong link 
between legal origin and financial development.  FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN enters significantly in 
all regressions and its inclusion substantially increases the adjusted R
2 over those regressions that 
only include LATITUDE.  Especially given the imprecise nature of LATITUDE as proxy for the 
AJR (2001) endowment theory, we view Table 8 as confirmation of our earlier findings. 
4.5. Tobit estimation 
  Finally, we estimate the stock market development equations using a Tobit estimator.  Both 
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT (market capitalization divided by GDP) and TOTAL 
VALUE TRADED (stock market trading divided by GDP) have many countries with zero values.  
Thus, we re-estimate the equation using a Tobit estimator.  As shown in Table 9, we find that both 
legal origin and endowments enter significantly in all of the regressions when using the Tobit 
estimator, confirming earlier results. 
  30 
5. Conclusions 
This paper assesses two theories regarding the historical determinants of financial 
development.  The law and finance theory predicts that historically determined differences in legal 
origin can explain cross-country differences in financial development observed today.  Specifically, 
the law and finance theory predicts that countries that inherited the British Common law tradition 
obtained a legal tradition that tends to both emphasize private property rights and support financial 
development to a much greater degree than countries that obtained the French Civil law tradition.  
The endowment theory, on the other hand, predicts that the initial environmental endowments 
encountered by European colonizers shaped the types of long-lasting institutions created by those 
colonizers.  Specifically, hospitable endowments favored the construction of settler colonies, where 
Europeans established secure property rights.  In contrast, colonies with high settler mortality rates 
fostered the construction of extractive colonies, where Europeans established institutions that 
facilitated state control and resource extraction. According to the endowment theory, the long-
lasting institutions created by colonizers continue to influence financial development today.   
Although both the law and endowment theories stress the importance of how initial 
conditions influence institutions today, there are crucial differences.  The law and finance theory 
focuses on the legal tradition spread by the colonizer.  Thus, the identity of the colonizer is key. The 
endowment theory focuses on how the colony’s endowments shaped the construction of long-
lasting institutions.  Thus, the endowment theory focuses on the conditions of the colony, not the 
identity of the colonizer. 
  The paper provides qualified support for the law and finance theory (Hayek, 1960; LLSV, 
1998).  One important qualification is that the connection between legal origin and financial 
intermediary development is not robust to controlling for endowments and other country  31 
characteristics.  Legal origin, however, explains cross-country differences in private property rights 
protection even after controlling for initial endowment indicators, religious composition, ethnic 
diversity, and the fraction of years the country has been independent since 1776.  Furthermore, 
except when controlling for religious composition (there is a strong correlation between French 
legal heritage and the Catholic religion), there is a robust link between legal origin and stock market 
development—French Civil law countries have significantly lower levels of stock market 
development than British Common law countries after controlling for other country characteristics.   
The data provide strong support for the endowment view.  Countries with poor geographical 
endowments, as measured by the log of settler mortality, tend to have less developed financial 
intermediaries, less developed stock markets, and weaker property rights protection.  These results 
hold after controlling for legal origin, the percentage of years since 1776 the country has been 
independent, the religious composition of the country, and the degree of ethnic diversity. In terms of 
comparing the law and endowment theories, the empirical results indicate that both the legal 
systems brought by colonizers and the initial endowments in the colonies are important 
determinants of stock market development and private property rights protection.  However, initial 
endowments are more robustly associated with financial intermediary development than legal 
origin.  Moreover, initial endowments explain more of the cross-country variation in financial 
intermediary and stock market development than legal origin.  In sum, and consistent with AJR’s 
(2001) endowment theory, we find a robust link between initial endowments and current levels of 
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Fig. 2a: Private credit in Civil law countries 
 
Private Credit is the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP.  Civil law countries are 
countries whose legal system is of French Civil law origin, whereas Common law countries are countries whose legal system is of 

















































Fig. 2b: Private Credit in Common law countries 
 
Private Credit is the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP.  Civil law countries are 
countries whose legal system is of French Civil law origin, whereas Common law countries are countries whose legal system is of 
British Common law origin.  There are 45 Civil law and 25 Common law countries in the sample. 
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s
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
d
e
a
t
h
s
 
p
e
r
 
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
s
o
l
d
i
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
l
o
n
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
a
r
l
y
 
1
9
t
h
 
c
e
n
t
u
r
y
.
 
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
a
r
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
n
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
s
 
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
o
r
 
S
u
b
-
S
a
h
a
r
a
n
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
C
a
t
h
o
l
i
c
,
 
M
u
s
l
i
m
,
 
a
n
d
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
R
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
 
a
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
 
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
 
(
C
a
t
h
o
l
i
c
,
 
M
u
s
l
i
m
,
 
o
r
 
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
s
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
C
a
t
h
o
l
i
c
,
 
M
u
s
l
i
m
,
 
o
r
 
P
r
o
t
e
s
t
a
n
t
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
)
.
 
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
7
7
6
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
.
 
 
E
t
h
n
i
c
 
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
w
o
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
t
 
s
p
e
a
k
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
.
 
L
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
C
h
e
c
k
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
e
t
o
-
p
l
a
y
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
m
a
k
i
n
g
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
s
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
t
w
o
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
1
9
9
0
 
t
o
 
1
9
9
5
.
 
 
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
.
 
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
:
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
 
N
 
M
e
a
n
 
S
t
d
.
 
D
e
v
.
 
M
i
n
M
a
x
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r
i
v
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r
e
d
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.
0
1
1
.
4
8
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
7
0
 
0
.
1
9
 
0
.
4
0
 
0
.
0
0
1
.
8
9
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
 
6
9
 
3
.
1
2
 
0
.
9
9
 
1
.
0
0
5
.
0
0
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
7
0
 
0
.
6
4
 
0
.
4
8
 
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
 
S
e
t
t
l
e
r
 
M
o
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.
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t
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l
i
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u
s
l
i
m
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.
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i
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e
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P
a
n
e
l
 
B
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C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
t
r
i
x
 
o
f
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
S
e
t
t
l
e
r
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
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f
r
i
c
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L
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t
i
n
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m
e
r
i
c
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t
h
o
l
i
c
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m
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e
r
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e
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i
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d
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p
e
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c
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p
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4
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T
a
b
l
e
 
2
 
L
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
i
s
:
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
=
 
α
 
+
 
β
1
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
+
 
β
2
X
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
,
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
o
r
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
.
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
s
 
b
y
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
.
 
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
l
i
s
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
.
 
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
 
r
e
f
l
e
c
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
t
o
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
s
 
l
a
w
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
i
s
 
a
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
n
e
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
C
i
v
i
l
 
l
a
w
 
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
z
e
r
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
a
 
v
e
c
t
o
r
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
 
X
.
 
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
a
r
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
n
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
s
 
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
o
r
 
S
u
b
-
S
a
h
a
r
a
n
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
C
a
t
h
o
l
i
c
,
 
M
u
s
l
i
m
,
 
a
n
d
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
R
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
 
a
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
 
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
 
(
C
a
t
h
o
l
i
c
,
 
M
u
s
l
i
m
,
 
o
r
 
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
s
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
C
a
t
h
o
l
i
c
,
 
M
u
s
l
i
m
,
 
o
r
 
P
r
o
t
e
s
t
a
n
t
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
)
.
 
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
7
7
6
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
.
 
 
E
t
h
n
i
c
 
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
w
o
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
t
 
s
p
e
a
k
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
.
 
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
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p
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c
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p
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c
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c
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c
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c
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v
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c
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.
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l
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c
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u
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c
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r
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c
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c
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i
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u
d
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h
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i
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c
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p
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d
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c
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p
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c
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p
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c
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p
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i
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d
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p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
.
 
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
:
 
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
 
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
E
t
h
n
i
c
 
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
-
R
2
 
O
b
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
1
.
0
4
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
1
8
9
 
7
0
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
(
0
.
3
0
0
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
4
2
3
 
-
0
.
3
1
9
*
*
 
-
0
.
3
8
0
*
*
*
 
0
.
0
3
4
 
-
0
.
0
1
8
 
0
.
3
4
6
 
7
0
 
 
(
0
.
3
2
7
)
 
(
0
.
1
4
7
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
6
8
)
 
(
0
.
1
3
5
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
0
.
4
9
1
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
1
2
 
7
0
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
(
0
.
3
8
6
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
-
0
.
1
7
1
 
-
0
.
4
0
2
*
*
 
-
0
.
4
7
0
*
 
0
.
0
8
5
 
0
.
1
2
1
 
0
.
1
2
0
 
7
0
 
 
(
0
.
6
8
0
)
 
(
0
.
1
9
8
)
 
(
0
.
2
4
4
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
6
)
 
(
0
.
1
9
8
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
3
.
2
3
2
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
1
6
5
 
6
9
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
 
(
0
.
7
8
4
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
.
6
0
0
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
0
4
0
 
-
1
.
1
2
2
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
5
6
9
 
0
.
7
0
8
 
0
.
2
6
7
 
6
9
 
 
(
0
.
9
5
2
)
 
(
0
.
4
2
9
)
 
(
0
.
3
3
9
)
 
(
0
.
4
7
4
)
 
(
0
.
4
6
2
)
 
 
 
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
 
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
,
 
l
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
:
 
 
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
E
t
h
n
i
c
 
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
-
R
2
 
O
b
s
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
0
.
9
7
0
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
2
0
6
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
2
8
6
 
7
0
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
(
0
.
2
7
6
)
 
(
0
.
0
7
9
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
3
8
1
 
-
0
.
1
6
2
*
*
 
-
0
.
2
8
8
*
*
 
-
0
.
3
1
2
*
*
 
0
.
1
2
2
 
-
0
.
0
5
5
 
0
.
3
9
2
 
7
0
 
 
(
0
.
3
0
1
)
 
(
0
.
0
7
8
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
7
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
2
)
 
(
0
.
1
7
1
)
 
(
0
.
1
4
1
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
0
.
3
6
0
 
-
0
.
3
4
6
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
1
7
5
 
7
0
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
(
0
.
3
5
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
2
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
-
0
.
2
5
1
 
-
0
.
3
1
2
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
3
4
1
*
 
-
0
.
3
3
9
 
0
.
2
5
6
*
*
 
0
.
0
5
1
 
0
.
2
2
9
 
7
0
 
 
(
0
.
6
1
3
)
 
(
0
.
1
0
4
)
 
(
0
.
1
7
9
)
 
(
0
.
1
3
4
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
7
)
 
(
0
.
1
7
3
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
2
.
9
2
4
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
8
7
3
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
3
3
5
 
6
9
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
 
(
0
.
6
5
9
)
 
(
0
.
2
2
4
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
.
3
9
8
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
8
2
1
*
*
*
 
0
.
1
2
0
 
-
0
.
7
8
3
*
*
 
-
0
.
1
2
0
 
0
.
5
1
7
 
0
.
3
9
2
 
6
9
 
 
(
0
.
8
4
3
)
 
(
0
.
2
0
1
)
 
(
0
.
3
4
1
)
 
(
0
.
3
0
8
)
 
(
0
.
3
5
3
)
 
(
0
.
4
5
3
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5
6
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
9
 
L
a
w
,
 
e
n
d
o
w
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
:
 
T
o
b
i
t
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
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e
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i
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l
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c
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c
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o
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c
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c
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c
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